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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TREVOR POWELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010995-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996 & Supp. 2001) (pour-over 
provision). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Are the trial court's factual findings sufficient to support the denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress the identification of him as the robber? 
Standard of Review: Because this claim is raised for the first time on appeal, this 
Court reviews the record below for plain error. State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, % 8, 9 P.3d 
164. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court correctly determine that the eyewitness 
identification of defendant from a photo array was not impermissibly suggestive and, 
therefore, admissible? 
Standard of Review: "Whether a pretrial photo array violates a citizen's 
constitutional right to due process is a question of law, which we review for correctness .. 
.. At the same time, however, because this question of law requires the application of the 
record facts to the due process standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for 
the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^  22,48 
P.3d953 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court correctly deny a motion for a mistrial based on 
defendant's claim that the State failed to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence? 
Standard of Review: Issues specifically preserved in defendant's motion for a 
mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230-31 
(Utah 1997). Issues that defendant explicitly waived during the trial cannot be reviewed, 
even under a plain error standard. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[I]f 
trial counsel's action amounted to an active, as opposed to a passive, waiver of an 
objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent portions of constitutional provisions, statutes and rules relevant to this 
appeal are set forth below: 
i 
Utah Const art. I, § 7: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 17, 2001, defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). R. 1. Defendant was bound 
over for trial on July 25, 2001, following a preliminary hearing in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. R. 16. 
On August 4, 2001, defendant filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness's 
identification of him as the robber. R. 30. On August 10,2001, the trial court held a 
hearing on the motion to suppress. R. 208. The court denied the motion on August 22, 
2001. R. 83; 209:2. 
Defendant was convicted on September 6, 2001, following a one-day jury trial. R. 
178-81. On October 27, 2001, defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life at the Utah 
State Prison and ordered to pay $789 in restitution. R. 184-85. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Heidi Shelton gave him the benefit of the doubt. Although the man entering the 
salon appeared "really dirty," she thought he might be just another customer looking for a 
quick tan. R. 211:128, 131. 
"[H]i," she said. "[W]hat is your last name?" R. 211:132. 
1
 Facts are stated in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying the 
motion to suppress. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, If 2, 994 P.2d 1283. 
3 
The man look around furtively. Then, he raised the sleeve of his jacket, revealing 
the handle of a knife. He told her to give him the money from the register. R. 211:133. 
Ms. Shelton, a 16-year-old high school student, was understandably flustered. As 
she attempted to retrieve the money from the register, bills tumbled to the ground, 
requiring her to fumble on the floor to retrieve them. R. 2 i 1: 133-34. 
Despite her discomfiture, Ms. Shelton carefully eyed the man, who was only four 
feet away in the well-lighted waiting room. She estimated that during the three-to-four 
minutes the man was in the store, she looked directly at him 10-to-15 times. He wore a 
stocking cap, a black nylon jacket and blue jeans. "[H]is eyes sinked [sic] into his head a 
little bit, he has a sandy brown mustache, he just looked really dirty." R. 211:131, 134-
36. 
Finally, the robber grabbed die money and fled. R. 211:136. 
The composite 
The next day, police asked Ms. Shelton to come to the Orem City police station to 
provide further information. She reviewed several books of photos supplied by the 
police, but the robber was not among them. "I would have recognized him if I would 
have seen him" in die photo books, she later said. R. 211:149. 
She also met with Detective Barry Nielsen, who attempted to use a computer 
program to generate a composite photo of the robber based on Ms. Shelton's description. 
R. 211:161, 164. 
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Ms. Shelton was not pleased with the result. She said that although the composite 
came close to capturing the robber's distinctive eyes, the rest of the features were just "as 
close as I could get him to," given the limitations of the software. R. 211:177-78. 
Detective Nielsen also acknowledged the limitations of the computer program. By 
the time of trial, he had obtained better software with a greater selection of different 
features that could be mixed and matched. R. 211:185-88. 
The unsatisfactory composite was distributed to other law enforcement agencies, 
but never yielded any results. R. 211:186. When Detective Nielsen obtained new 
information implicating defendant, he abandoned the composite altogether. R. 211:186-
87. 
The photo array 
Four months later, Officer Nielsen contacted Ms. Shelton to announce that he had 
a suspect in the robbery and that he wanted to show her some photos. R. 211:73-74. 
Detective Nielsen then used a computer to randomly select photos of five other men who 
matched defendant's characteristics. R. 211:82-84. He printed the photos on a single 
sheet of paper, situating them in three rows and two columns. He placed defendant's 
photo in the middle row, the number "4" spot. R. 211:86. A copy of the photo array is 
attached as Addendum A. 
Before showing the photos to Ms. Shelton, he advised her that the robber may or 
may not be among them. He told her to look carefully at each photo and decide if she 
recognized any of them. He also told her not to choose anyone if she did not recognize 
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any of them. R.211:74. He watched as she reviewed the photos, her eyes moving back 
and forth from one row to the next. R. 211:101. Then, she made a selection: Number 4. 
Id. 
"[W]hen I got to number four, I knew that was him," she recalled. R. 211:138-39. 
Asked at trial if she picked out the subject who looked c<most like the robber," Ms. 
Shelton made the following reply: '"No, not most like. He looked exactly like." R. 
211:154. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: In reviewing the motion to suppress the eyewitness identification, the trial 
court carefully fulfilled its "gatekeeper" function by determining that the testimony of 
Ms. Shelton was reliable enough to be presented to the jury. In so doing, the court 
considered the preliminary hearing testimony of Ms. Shelton and Detective Nielsen and 
made appropriate findings on the record. These findings are not insufficient, not clearly 
erroneous and should be affirmed. 
Point II: Based on those findings, the court concluded that the photo array 
was not unduly suggestive and that admitting Ms. Shelton's testimony would not violate 
defendant's right to due process. This ruling accords with well-established Utah 
precedent and should also be affirmed. 
Point III: Defendant's claim that the State withheld allegedly exculpatory evidence 
fails for two main reasons. First, the composite prepared by Detective Nielsen was 
produced and introduced at trial and defendant's trial counsel orally waived any objec 
6 
to any delay in producing it. Second, the claim that defendant may have been pictured in 
the photo books Ms. Shelton reviewed the day after the robbery, and that her failure to 
identify him would have been exculpatory, is mere conjecture and, as such, cannot 
amount to a violation of defendant's due process rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF 
DEFENDANT WAS RELIABLE UNDER THE 
RAMIREZ CRITERIA. 
When asked, a trial court has the responsibility to make a preliminary 
determination as to the reliability of eyewitness testimony before it may be admitted. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991). In making this determination, the court 
considers the following factors: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of 
the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his 
or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether 
it was the product of suggestion; and 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood 
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. 
Id. at 781 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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Defendant first argues that the trial court's factual findings underlying its denial of 
the motion to suppress are insufficient under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
because they do not focus on the Ramirez factors. Defendant then argues that even if the 
findings are sufficient, the identification was nonetheless defective under Ramirez. As 
shown below, neither argument is persuasive. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings Were not Cleariy Erroneous; 
Alternatively, If the Findings were Inadequate, the Error 
Was Harmless. 
Defendant claims the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings and that 
such a failure constituted plain error. Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant claims that the trial 
court's "complete statement" regarding the motion to suppress is as follows: 
Fm going to deny that motion. I have the original here, and 
all the reasons given regarding the dark shirt, there are two 
others, although their angles are a little different, but also are 
wearing dark shirts. The mustache is not that noticeable. In 
fact, the bottom right person looks like they've even taken the 
mustache off of him. It looks very lighter [sic] around his 
mouth area. The witness that testified had no hesitation when 
she picked out the individual. I looked at this; it does not 
single out any person. I had third parties look at and I said, 
"Tell me, does this appear - who would you pick if you 
wanted to from this," and they actually thought the person 
with the long hair was the one that was more singled out than 
the defendant So I am going to deny the motion to suppress 
this. 
Aplt. Br. at 12 (citing R. 209:2). 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that defendant faces a very difficult and perhaps 
impossible burden in making this argument. Although defendant acknowledges that the 
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The court also indicated that the witness never felt pressured to pick out someone 
from the photo array: "In other cases Fve seen that where there have been some 
uncertainty [sic] and it's almost like, 4Gee, I better pick on[e] of these people.' But I 
didn't see that in this case." 
Thus, a review of the complete record shows that the trial court's factual findings 
concerning the motion to suppress were not insufficient. But even if the findings were 
inadequate, any error was harmless. Harmless error can occur, first, "if the undisputed 
evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which the findings are missing," or 
second, "even given controverted evidence . . . if the absent findings can reasonably be 
implied." Colonial Pac. Leasing, 1999 UT App 91 at f 17; see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
787 (appellate court may "assume that the trier of fact found them in accord with its 
decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find 
facts to support it"). 
For the most part, the evidence concerning eyewitness identification was 
uncontroverted. As explained above, the trial court clearly found that Ms. Shelton had 
ample opportunity to observe the robber's face. Defendant did not seriously dispute those 
prongs of the Ramirez test; rather, defendant's main thrust below and on appeal is to 
contest the propriety of the photo array, arguing that it was overly suggestive because 
defendant was the only person among the six pictured with a mustache and a dark shirt. 
R. 208:20. The record clearly shows that the trial court was mindful of these contentions 
11 
and rejected them. Findings may be implied if it is clear that the trial court must have 
resolved a factual question in order to reach its conclusion. As this Court has held: 
Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume 
that the trial court actually considered the controverted 
evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the 
controversy, but simply failed to record the factual 
determination it made. 
Colonial Pac. Leasing, 1999 UT App 91 at J 18. The transcript of the August 10, 2001, 
hearing shows that the court had an extensive colloquy with defense counsel as to 
whether defendant's mustache made the photo array unduly suggestive. See, e.g., R. 
208:20. It is clear that the court resolved that factual issue in favor of the State, noting at 
several points that the witness had stated unequivocally that it was not his mustache, but 
his eyes that allowed her to identify him as the robber. R. 208:8,9,20. 
The only other matter that seemed to trouble the trial court was whether the photo 
array was overly suggestive because defendant's photo revealed his upper chest and the 
black shirt, while the other photos were cropped closely around the subjects' faces. R. 
208:16. For that reason, the court took the motion under advisement and requested 
additional briefing on that issue because 'it's apparent in this case that the photo of the 
defendant is slightly from a different distance than the other five in the photo array." Id. 
After the State submitted a brief citing numerous cases holding that the size and shape of 
a photo did not taint the photo array, R. 71-75, die court denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
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In sum, the trial court carefully considered the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing and made appropriate findings on the record in denying defendant's 
motion to suppress. The trial court's findings are either stated in the record or implicit 
from the court's ruling. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress the Eyewitness Testimony of the Victim. 
Defendant claims that the identification of defendant from the photo array and in 
court at his preliminary hearing was contrary to the principles enunciated in Ramirez. 
Aplt. Br. at 16-18. This argument is unpersuasive. 
The due process provision of article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires a 
two-step analysis to determine the admissibility of eyewitness identification based on a 
photo array. First, the trial court must examine the photo array and 'the procedural 
actions taken by law enforcement officials in assembling and presenting a photo array to 
witnesses for due process . . . " State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, f 25, 48 P.3d 953. 
Second, the trial court must "make a preliminary determination on whether the 
identification is sufficiently reliable such that its admission and consideration by the jury 
will not violate defendant's right to due process/' Id. This preliminary determination is 
part of the trial court's gatekeeper function and should not usurp the role of the jury as 
factfinder. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Our determination . . . is only whether the proffered evidence 
is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury 
for their deliberation. Courts need not, nor should they, step 
into the province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of 
13 
identification for the jurors. Courts must simply decide 
whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable so as not to 
offend defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly 
unreliable identification testimony before the jury. 
Id. at K 30 (emphasis added). 
1. The photo array was not impermissibly suggestive and did 
not violate defendant's due process rights. 
Defendant claims that he stood out in the photo array because he was the only 
person with a mustache and dark shirt. R. 211:86-87. However, this claim is a quibble. 
Viewed in context, the photo array did not single out defendant. 
In evaluating the constitutional validity of the assembly and presentation of a 
photo array, trial courts consider factors such as the similarities in the appearance of those 
pictured, the order in which they were presented and whether die presenting officer did 
anything to influence the witness's selection. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at f 24. In Hubbard, 
the Utah Supreme Court endorsed a procedure in which all the subjects, including 
defendant, were similar in basic characteristics such as ethnicity. However, the court did 
not require the defendant's features to match perfectly with those of other subjects. 
"Some appear to have somewhat different skin tones, and the amount and style of facial 
hair differ somewhat among the photos." Id. Before presenting the photos, the officer 
advised the witness that die assailant may or may not be among them. Id. Of the six 
photos presented, "defendant's was neither the first or the last . . ." Id. The Supreme 
Court concluded that the photo array was not "impermissibly suggestive" and not likely 
to result in "irreparable misidentification." Id. 
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Similarly, here, die assembly and presentation of the photo array was not 
impermissibly suggestive. Detective Nielson testified that he compiled the photo array 
with a computer by searching for the following criteria: white male, 20-to-30 years old, 
brown hair and average build. R. 211:84, 97. He mounted the photos on a single sheet of 
paper configured in two columns and three rows. Defendant was situated in the middle 
row and identified as number "4." Detective Nielsen told Ms. Shelton that the robber 
may or may not be among the photos. R. 211:94. He also told her that the investigation 
would continue even if she did not select someone. Id. This procedure tracks that 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hubbard. Those chosen for the photo array matched 
defendant's ethnicity, his age and his hair color. The photos were arranged so that 
defendant was neither first nor last There were, of course, differences among those 
pictured, but such differences are inevitable given that each individual has a unique 
combination of features. The bottom line, however, is that nothing in the photo array was 
impermissibly suggestive. 
Defendant attempts to capitalize on the fact that he is the only one of the subjects 
with a mustache and a black shirt. These differences do not invalidate the photo array. 
First, defendant overstates the significance of these differences. As the trial court noted, 
defendant's thin, wispy ''mustache" is easily missed. And while he is obviously wearing 
a black shirt, it is clear that others in the array are also wearing black, although their 
closer-cropped photos make it somewhat less apparent. Such minor differences are not 
fatal. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, f 24 (differences in skin tone and facial hair did not 
15 
make photo array unfairly suggestive). Other courts have determined that minor 
differences in facial hair and clothing do not invalidate a photo array. See, e.g., State v. 
Hyde, 898 P.2d 71, 77 (Idaho App. 1995) (photo lineup not defective, even though 
defendant was only subject with a mustache that differed in color from his hair); People v. 
Webster, 987 P.2d 836, 839 (Colo. App. 1998) (photo array upheld, even though 
defendant was the only subject with "geri curls"); People v. DeSantis, 831 P.2d 1210, 
1222 (Cal. 1992), cert, denied 508 U.S. 917 (1993) (photographic lineup not unduly 
suggestive even though perpetrator reportedly wore a red shirt and defendant was only 
member of the lineup with a red shirt), n sum, the photo array was not impermissibly 
suggestive and the trial court did not err in admitting the eyewitness testimony of Ms. 
Shelton. 
2. The trial court properly determined that the eyewitness 
identification of defendant was reliable. 
Defendant claims that Ms. Shelton's testimony should have been excluded under 
Ramirez because her identification of defendant was not spontaneous and her initial 
description of the robber was inconsistent with defendant's appearance. Aplt. Br. at 18-
20. This argument is without merit 
As noted, a trial court must determine whether the eyewitness testimony is 
sufficiently reliable to be presented to the trier of fact. This determination is made by 
application of the principles enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 778. In Ramirez, defendant was convicted of aggravated assault based largely on the 
16 
eyewitness identification by one of the victims. There, two men armed with a gun and a 
pipe, accosted a restaurant manager and her husband and brother as the three left the 
building. Id. at 776. It was night and both robbers wore scarves that covered most of 
their faces. Id. Shortly after the robbers fled, police arrested defendant who was walking 
along a road a short distance from the robbery scene. Id. The three victims were 
transported to the location where defendant had been arrested to view the defendant, who 
was handcuffed to a chain link fence and illuminated by squad car headlights. Id. Two of 
the victims could not identify defendant as one of the assailants, but the third did identify 
him. Id. 
Although acknowledging that the witness's identification of Ramirez presented an 
"extremely close case," the court nonetheless upheld the eyewitness identification. Id. at 
784. Deferring to the trial court's superior position to judge the credibility of witnesses, 
and viewing the facts in a light favorable to the trial court's decision, the court stated: 
"[W]e cannot say that Wilson's testimony is legally insufficient when considered in light 
of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, 
admissibility." Id. 
Despite defendant's claims to the contrary, this is not "an extremely close case." 
Ms. Shelton testified that the encounter with defendant lasted several minutes. R. 
211:136. Defendant was only four feet from her in a well-lighted room and she looked at 
him directly in the face 10-to-15 times. R. 211:135. He was not wearing a mask and had 
nothing covering his face. R. 211:135. She took special note of his eyes, which she 
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described as "sinked [sic] into his head." R. 211:131. In short, Ms. Shelton's ability to 
observe defendant clearly met all of the Ramirez criteria. 
Defendant claims, nonetheless, that Ms. Shelton's identification was defective 
because it was not spontaneous or consistent. Defendant notes that while the Ramirez 
witnesses made their identification 30 minutes after the robbery, Ms. Shelton did not 
identify defendant until four months later. Aplt. Br. at 18. "Shelton did not immediately 
pick out Powell as the suspect, but 'went back and forth' looking at all the photos before 
she picked Powell."3 Aplt. Br. at 21. He also points out that although Ms. Shelton 
initially described the robber's age as late 20s to early 30s, she acknowledged at the 
preliminary that defendant did not look that age. Aplt. Br. at 18. 
These arguments are unavailing. The evidence introduced at the preliminary 
hearing and at trial shows that Ms. Shelton's testimony was spontaneous and consistent. 
Although Ms. Shelton did not identify defendant until four months later, that was only 
because she was not given the opportunity until four months later. When shown a photo 
array containing a picture of defendant, she immediately and spontaneously identified 
him as the robber. R. 211:138-39, 154. Moreover, the single inconsistency defendant 
identifies about his age is insignificant when compared to the overall consistency in her 
descriptions, as the following excerpt illustrates: 
3
 This characterization is misleading because it implies that Ms. Shelton could not 
make up her mind. In context, Detective Nielsen's use of the phrase "back and fortlT 
was merely a description of how Ms. Shelton's eyes moved as she examined the photo 
array .^ 211:101. Ms. Shelton testified that she immediately recognized defendant as the 
robber. R. 211:138-39, 154 
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Q. [by defense counsel] And when you spoke to the officers, you 
described the person as being 5' 8["] about? 
A. [by Ms. Shelton] Somewhere around there. 
Q. You described the person as being in their late 20s or early 
30s? 
Yes. 
Q. Is that right? And you said that the person had a sandy brown 
colored mustache; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You also said that the person was not overweight, just average 
in build and statute; is that right. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that's how you described the person in January. 
A. (Witness indicates in the affirmative.) 
Q. The person who you picked out of the photo array or you 
identified today, does he look to be in his late 20s or early 30s. 
A. No. 
R. 207:17-18. The defense attorney did not question Ms. Shelton about any additional 
inconsistencies because there were none. Additionally, any discrepancies between Ms. 
Shelton's "initial description of her assailant and defendant's physical characteristics,... 
are primarily matters of the credibility of the witness [and] best left to the finders of fact." 
State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1983). 
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Defendant also claims that Ms. Shelton's identification of him at the preliminary 
hearing was suggestive because he was "the only person wearing handcuffs, bright orange 
inmate clothing and the only person sitting with the defense attorney." Aplt. Br. at 19. 
Defendant seems to argue that the preliminary hearing identification of defendant was 
improper because it was tainted by the photo array. However, because the photo array 
was properly conducted, it could not taint subsequent identifications. Moreover, there is 
nothing inherently improper about identifying a suspect who displays indicia of arrest, 
such as handcuffs or jail clothing. In Ramirez, for example, the identification of the 
defendant passed muster even though it took place while the suspect was handcuffed to a 
fence and bathed in police spotlights. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784; see also State v. Rivera, 
954 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah App. 1998) (identification admissible even though defendant 
was handcuffed and being held by officers). 
In short, the eyewitness testimony of Ms. Shelton was properly determined to be 
reliable and the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BASED 
ON THE PROSECUTION'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO 
PRODUCE ALLEGEDLY EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant claims that prosecutors should have disclosed that, the day after the 
robbery, Ms. Shelton reviewed several photos of possible suspects. Aplt. Br. at 25. 
Defendant claims that the photo books reviewed by Ms. Shelton should have been 
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produced because the photos would have been exculpatory //defendant had been pictured 
there and Ms. Shelton failed to identify him. 
This argument, however, was squarely rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1983). There, the victim was a woman who was 
assaulted by a man who came to her door asking to use the phone book. The victim was 
shown a photo array, but did not identify any of the photos as her attacker. She was 
subsequently shown a second a photo array and tentatively identified her attacker. She 
then positively identified the defendant as the culprit during a live lineup. Defendant was 
convicted and on appeal claimed that his due process rights were violated because police 
had not maintained the first photo array. Id. at 1361. The Nebeker defendant reasoned, as 
does the defendant in this case, that the initial photo array would have been exculpatory if 
he had been pictured, but not identified by the victim. The Utah Supreme Court flatly 
rejected this argument. 
[T]he defendant was not affirmatively identified in the 
unpreserved array nor did the witnesses fail to identify the 
defendant from an array in which the defendant's photograph 
had been specifically placed after the investigation focused on 
the defendant In light of these factors and testimony that 
defendant's photograph did not appear in those arrays, the 
Court concludes that defendant's claim is based on a mere 
possibility that the photo arrays might have affected the trial 
outcome and, therefore, the inability of the prosecution to 
reconstruct those arrays is not material in the constitutional 
sense. 
Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, there was no evidence here that defendant's photo appeared in the books 
viewed by Ms. Shelton. In fact, the evidence at trial was just the opposite: 
Q. [by defense counsel] Do you know whether you 
saw a picture of Mr. Powell on that occasion? 
A. [by Ms. Shelton] No. 
Q. You don't know if-
A. No, he wasn't there. 
Q. Do you know he wasn't in there because the 
police told you that or you just know because - you know that 
because you don't believe you picked him out? 
A. And I know because I would have recognized 
him if I would have seen him. 
R. 211:149. In light of this testimony, and the complete lack of evidence to the contrary, 
defendant's argument consists of the '"mere possibility" that the original photo array 
might have contained exculpatory evidence.4 Because a mere possibility cannot establish 
a due process violation, defendant's argument fails. See Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1364. 
Finally, defendant argues that a police composite sketch prepared by Detective 
Nielsen shortly after the robbery was also exculpatory and should also have been 
provided to the defense. This argument fails, first, because it was affirmatively waived. 
After obtaining a copy of the composite from the State, defendant's trial counsel stated: 
4
 The only suggestion defendant offers to support his claim is that, upon review of 
the photo books following trial, "[t]here were several pages with spaces where photos 
may have previously been placed but were now missing . . ." Aplt. Br. at 25. Such 
speculation demonstrates nothing and should be rejected out of hand. 
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"I don't have a problem with the notice requirement since we have it [the composite] here 
today and we have it now, but I think it is potentially exculpatory and I want it 
introduced." R. 211: 165-66. Because defendant affirmatively waived any objection to 
the late production of the composite, he cannot raise the issue on appeal even under a 
plain error standard. See, e.g., Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1206 ("The doctrine of invited error 
'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appear') 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[I]f trial 
counsel's action amounted to an active, as opposed to a passive, waiver of an objection, 
we may decline to consider the claim of plain error"); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 
(Utah App. 1992) ("[W]hen counsel makes a 'conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting,' we may decline to consider an argument of plain error") (citation omitted). 
Second, even if this argument had not been waived, it still fails simply because the 
composite was produced at trial and used by defendant. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated, the nondisclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence 'Violates due process under 
Brady? only if the evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if the defense did not 
become aware of the evidence until after trial." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, H 36, 37 
P.3d 1073. Defendant became aware of the composite during Ms. Shelton's testimony 
and was presented a copy during a break. R. 211:161. When the trial resumed, defendant 
cross-examined both Ms. Shelton and Detective Nielsen about how the composite was 
prepared and why it had not been provided to the defense earlier. R. 211:180-83, 187-88. 
5Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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In closing, defendant argued to the jury that the composite did not resemble the defendant 
and that the discrepancy indicated Ms. Shelton had identified the wrong person. R. 
211:212-13. Thus, the record shows clearly that defendant had ample opportunity to use 
the composite as part of the effort to prove his innocence. Although defendant now 
claims that the composite should have been produced before trial, he has not 
demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice by receiving it at trial. Absent such a 
showing, defendant has not demonstrated a due process violation. 
CONCLUSION6 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9* day of December, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETTJ.DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
6
 Defendant also argues, on the final page of his brief, that his conviction should be 
reversed because of cumulative error. Because the State has demonstrated that the trial 
court committed no errors, there can be no cumulative error. 
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this Court reviews his claim under a plain error standard, Aplt. Br. at 1, the record seems 
to indicate that this argument is not only unpreserved but affirmatively waived. When a 
question concerning the court's findings on the motion to suppress came up at trial, trial 
counsel and the judge had the following exchange: 
MR. GALE [defense counsel]: I think it was an oral 
ruling that you made from the bench. 
THE COURT: There was no question though about 
what I said is there? 
MR. GALE: No, there is not. 
R. 211:168. Because defendant approved the findings, he cannot on appeal complain that 
they were inadequate. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1206 (Utah App. 1991) ("The 
doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then 
complaining of it on appear") (citation omitted). Accordingly, this argument should be 
considered. 
Even if defendant did not affirmatively waive the objection, his argument still 
fails because he mistakenly focuses exclusively on a single excerpt from the transcript of 
the August 22, 2001, pre-trial conference in which the trial court summarized its ruling on 
defendant's motion. Id. at 12; R. 209:2.2 The court made additional findings on the 
2
 Although defendant does not explicitly argue that the trial court's findings should 
have been written, he nonetheless cites to State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 
1996), a case in which the Utah Supreme Court held that failure to enter written findings 
concerning the gang enhancement provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1999) was 
plain error. That case is readily distinguishable because the statute cited requires written 
findings. Here, by contrast, the findings must be on the record, but not necessarily 
written. See, e.g., State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, J 34, 48 P.3d 931 
9 
record during the August 10, 2001, pre-trial conference, in which the court heard 
arguments concerning defendant's motion to suppress. R. 208. Reviewing other portions 
of the record to discern the trial court's findings is entirely appropriate. As this Court has 
stated: '"In assessing the sufficiency of the findings . . . we are not confined to the 
contents of a particular document entitled 'Findings;' rather, the findings may be 
expressed orally from the bench or contained in other documents." Colonial Pac. Leasing 
Corp. v. J. W.CJ.R. Corp., 1999 UT App 91, If 28, n.6,977 P.2d 541. 
A review of the transcript of the August 10,2001, hearing demonstrates the trial 
court's careful application of the Ramirez factors in weighing defendant's motion to 
suppress. For example, the court commented during the hearing that Ms. Shelton had 
ample opportunity to observe the assailant during the robbery - findings which satisfy the 
first three Ramirez factors. The court noted: 
As to that aspect, this witness [Ms. Shelton] seemed to be 
very clear. She did have an opportunity to observe him for a 
significant amount of time. She did observe him. She was 
frightened. She didn't know if he was going to use a weapon 
or not, and she wasn't looking even at the money she was 
putting up on the counter, she was looking at him, whoever 
her assailant was. 
R. 208:14. Similarly, when choosing defendant from the photo array, "[s]he didn't 
hesitate, or she didn't say,'Well, it's either this person or this person. She - [identified]. 
.. a photo right away." R. 208:19. This comment shows that the court found the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously, this satisfying another Ramirez factor. 
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